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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the “uptick rule” (a short selling regulation
formally known as rule 10a- 1) by means of a simple stock market model, based
on the ARED (adaptive rational equilibrium dynamics) modeling framework, where
heterogeneous and adaptive beliefs on the future prices of a risky asset were first
shown to be responsible for endogenous price fluctuations.
The dynamics of stock prices generated by the model, with and without the uptick-
rule restriction, are analyzed by pairing the classical fundamental prediction with be-
liefs based on both linear and nonlinear technical analyses. The comparison shows a
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reduction of downward price movements of undervalued shares when the short sell-
ing restriction is imposed. This gives evidence that the uptick rule meets its intended
objective. However, the effects of the short selling regulation fade when the inten-
sity of choice to switch trading strategies is high. The analysis suggests possible side
effects of the regulation on price dynamics.
Keywords: Asset pricing model, Heterogeneous beliefs, Endogenous price fluctua-
tions, Piecewise-smooth dynamical systems, Chaos, Uptick-rule.
JEL codes: C62, G12, G18
1 Introduction
Short selling is the practice of selling financial instruments that have been borrowed, typi-
cally from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor, with the intent to buy the same class
of financial instruments in a future period and return them back at the maturity of the loan.
By short selling, investors open a so-called “short position”, that is technically equiv-
alent to holding a negative amount of shares of the traded asset, with the expectation that
the asset will recede in value in the next period. At the closing time specified in the short
selling contract, the debt is compounded with interest which occurred during the period
of the financial operation, for this reason short sellers prefer to close the short position
and reopen a new one with the same features, rather than extending the position over the
closing time (see, e.g., [Hull, 2011]).
A short position is the counterpart of the (more conventional) “long position”, i.e.
buying a security such as a stock, commodity, or currency, with the expectation that the
2
asset will rise in value.
Short selling is considered the father of the modern derivatives and, as such, it has a
double function: it can be used as an insurance device, by hedging the risk of long positions
in related stocks thus allowing risky financial operations, or for speculative purposes, to
profit from an expected downward price movement. Moreover, financial speculators can
sell short stocks in an effort to drive down the related price by creating an imbalance of
sell-side interest, the so called “bear raid” action. This feedback may lead to the market
collapse, and has indeed been observed during the financial crises of 1937 and 2007, see,
e.g., [Misra et al., 2012].
Many national authorities have developed different kinds of short selling restrictions
to avoid the negative effect of this financial practice1. Most of the regulations are based on
“price tests”, i.e., short selling is allowed or restricted depending on some tests based on
recent price movements. The best known and most widely applied of such regulations is
the so-called “uptick rule”, or rule 10a-1, imposed in 1938 by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission2 (hereafter SEC) to protect investors and was in force until 2007. This
rule regulated short selling into all U.S. stock markets and in the Toronto Stock Exchange.
Other financial markets, like the London Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
have different or no short selling restrictions (for a summary of short sale regulations in
approximately 50 different countries see [Bris et al., 2007]).
The uptick rule originally stated that short sales are allowed only on an uptick, i.e., at
1It is worth mentioning that short sale restrictions are nearly as old as organized exchanges. The first
short selling regulation was enacted in 1610 in the Amsterdam stock exchange. For a review of the history
of short sale restrictions, see Short History of the Bear, Edward Chancellor, October 29, 2001, copyright
David W. Tice and Co.
2The rule was originally introduced under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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a price higher than the last reported transaction price. The rule was later relaxed to allow
short sales to take place on a zero-plus-tick as well, i.e., at a price that is equal to the last
sale price but only if the most recent price movement has been positive. Conversely, short
sales are not permitted on minus- or zero-minus-ticks, subject to narrow exceptions3.
In adopting the uptick rule, the SEC sought to achieve three objectives4:
(i) allowing relatively unrestricted short selling in an advancing market;
(ii) preventing short selling at successively lower prices, thus eliminating short selling
as a tool for driving the market down; and
(iii) preventing short sellers from accelerating a declining market by exhausting all re-
maining bids at one price level, causing successively lower prices to be established
by long sellers.
The last two objectives have been partially confirmed by the empirical analysis (see,
e.g., [Alexander and Peterson, 1999] and reference therein). Instead, the regulation does
not seem to be effective in producing the first desired effect. The observed number of
executed short sales is indeed lower under uptick rule than in the unconstrained case,
during phases with an upward market trend, see again [Alexander and Peterson, 1999].
This is due to the asynchrony between placement and execution of a short-sell order, since
the rising of the price in between these two operations can make the trade not feasible
under the uptick rule.
3In the Canadian stock markets, the tick test was introduced under rule 3.1 of UMIR (Universal Market
Integrity Rules). It prevents short sales at a price that is less than the last sale price of the security.
4Quoted from the Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13091 (December 21, 1976), 41 FR 56530 (1976
Release).
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Moreover, empirical evidence provides uniform support of the idea that short selling
restrictions often cause share prices to rise. From a theoretical point of view, there is
no clear argument for explaining this mispricing effect of the uptick rule. According to
[Miller, 1977] this is due to a reduction in stock supply owing to the short sale restriction.
More generally, theoretical models with heterogeneous agents and differences in trading
strategies support the idea that share values become overvalued under short selling re-
strictions due to the fact that “pessimistic” and “bear” traders (expecting negative price
movements) are ruled out of the market (see, e.g., [Harrison and Kreps, 1978]). In con-
trast, theoretical models based on the assumption that all agents have rational expectations
suggest that short selling restrictions do not change on the average the stock prices (see,
e.g., [Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987]).
However, given the complexity of the phenomena, and the impossibility of isolating
the effects of a regulation from other concomitant changes in the economic scenario, the
effectiveness of the uptick rule in meeting the three above objectives, and its possible side
effects on shares’ prices, are still far from being completely clarified.
Guided by the aim to provide further insight on the argument, this paper studies the
effects on share prices in an artificial market of a short selling restriction based on a tick test
similar to the one imposed by the uptick rule in real financial markets. Using an artificial
asset pricing model makes it easier in assessing the effects of the uptick rule in isolation
from other exogenous shocks, though artificial modeling necessarily trades realism for
mathematical tractability.
We consider an asset pricing model of adaptive rational equilibrium dynamics (A.R.E.D.),
where heterogeneous beliefs on the future prices of a risky asset, together with traders’
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adaptability based on past performances, have shown to endogenously sustain price fluc-
tuations. Asset pricing models of A.R.E.D. (hereafter referred to simply as ARED asset
pricing models) are discrete-time dynamical systems based on the empirical evidence that
investors with different trading strategies coexist in the financial market (see, e.g., [Taylor
and Allen, 1992]). These simple models provide a theoretical justification for many “styl-
ized facts” observed in the real financial time series, such as, financial bubbles and volatil-
ity clustering (see [Gaunersdorfer, 2001], and [Gaunersdorfer et al., 2008]). Stochastic
models based on the same assumptions are even used to study exchange rate volatility and
the implication of some specific financial policies (see, e.g., [Westerhoff, 2001]).
We extend, in particular, the deterministic model introduced in [Brock and Hommes,
1998], where, in the simplest case, agents choose between two predictors of future prices
of a risky asset, i.e. a fundamental predictor and a non-fundamental predictor. Agents
that adopt the fundamental predictor are called fundametalists, while agents that adopt the
non-fundamental predictor are called noise traders or non-fundamental traders. Funda-
mentalists believe that the price of a financial asset is determined by its fundamental value
(as given by the present discounted value of the stream of future dividends, see [Hommes,
2001]) and any deviation from this value is only temporary. Non-fundamental traders,
sometimes called chartists or technical analysts, believe that the future price of a risky
asset is not completely determined by fundamentals and it can be predicted by simple
technical trading rules (see, e.g., [Elder, 1993], [Murphy, 1999], and [Nelly, 1997]).
In the model, agents revise their "beliefs", prediction to be adopted, according to an
evolutionary mechanism based on the past realized profits. As a result, the fundamental
value is a fixed point of the price dynamics, as, once there, both fundamentalists and non-
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fundamental traders predict the fundamental price. As long as the sensitivity of traders in
switching to the best performing predictor is relatively low, the fundamental equilibrium
is stable, but the fundamental stability is typically lost at higher intensities of the traders’
choice across the predictors, making room for financial bubbles.
It is worth to remember that [Brock and Hommes, 1998] investigated the peculiar case
of zero supply of outside shares. Under this assumption each bought share is sold short.
We therefore consider a positive supply of outside share, that is essential to ensure financial
transactions when short selling is forbidden5. Moreover, we pair the fundamental predictor
with first a technical linear predictor and then with a technical nonlinear predictor and
compare the results obtained with and without the uptick rule.
As linear predictor, we consider the chartist predictor introduced in [Brock and Hommes,
1998]. This facilitates the comparison of our results with those in [Brock and Hommes,
1998] and related papers. As nonlinear predictor, we introduce a new predictor, "Smoothed
Price Rate Of Change" or S-ROC predictor, that extrapolates future prices by applying the
rate of change averaged on past prices with a confidence mechanism smoothing out ex-
treme unrealistic rates (for an overview of this class of predictors, see [Elder, 1993]).
For what concerns the implementation of the regulation, we implement the uptick rule
as it was in its original formulation, i.e., short selling is allowed only on an uptick. Note,
however, that in an artificial asset pricing model a zero-tick is possible only at equilibrium,
so that allowing or forbidding short sales on zero-plus-ticks makes basically no change in
the observed price dynamics. In fact, with a positive supply of shares, traders take long
5We consider a positive supply of outside shares for the asset pricing model under Walrasian market
clearing at each period. A similar model under the market maker scenario has been considered by [Hommes
et al., 2005].
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positions at the fundamental equilibrium, so only the non-fundamental equilibria at which
one type of trader is prohibited to go short are affected by the rule behavior on zero-plus-
ticks (moreover, such equilibria are irrelevant to study the global price dynamics, as will
be explained in Section 2.3).
From the mathematical point of view, the uptick rule makes the asset pricing model a
piecewise-smooth dynamical system6, namely a system in which different mathematical
rules can be applied to determine the next price, and the rule to be applied depends on
the current state of the system, that is, on the fact that trader types are interested in going
short and whether short selling is allowed or not. Non-smooth dynamical systems are
certainly more problematic to analyze, both analytically and numerically (though non-
smooth dynamics is a very active topic in current research, see [di Bernardo et al., 2008],
and [Colombo et al., 2012], and references therein) so we will limit the analytical treatment
to stationary solutions.
Piecewise-smooth dynamical systems have already been used as models in finance.
[Tramontana et al., 2011] proposed a one-dimensional piecewise-linear asset pricing model,
where traders adopt different buying and selling strategies in response to different market
movements. Other examples can be found in [Tramontana et al., 2010a], [Tramontana
et al., 2010b], and [Tramontana and Westerhoff, 2013]. Two ARED piecewise-smooth
systems modeling short selling restrictions have been also proposed. Modifying the model
in [Brock and Hommes, 1998], [Anufriev and Tuinstra, 2009] restricted short selling by
allowing limited short positions at each trading period, whereas [Dercole and Cecchetto,
2010] investigated the complete ban on short selling. Thus both contributions implement
6To be precise, the model is a piecewise-continuous dynamical system. However, the class of piecewise-
smooth dynamical systems contains the class of piecewise-continuous dynamical systems.
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short selling restrictions that are not based on price tests.
The results of our theoretical analyses are in line with the empirical evidence. The sale
price that is established in our model when one trader type is prohibited from going short
is indeed systematically higher than the unconstrained price. Thus, constrained downward
movements below the fundamental value are less pronounced, whereas constrained up-
ward movements above the fundamental value can be larger. We provide a more complete
explanation for this effect, suggesting that it is due to the combination of two mecha-
nisms: on one side, the short selling restriction reduces the possibility for pessimistic or
bear traders to bet on downward movements below the fundamental value, avoiding ex-
cessive underpricing, but at the same time, when prices are above the fundamental value,
the restriction reduces the possibility for fundamentalists to drive down the prices back to
the fundamental value by opening short positions. This is in agreement with the last two
goals established by the SEC (see above). The first stated objective of the uptick is always
realized in our model, since the market clearing is assumed to be synchronous among all
traders.
When non-fundamental traders adopt the S-ROC predictor, we observe that the over-
pricing due to the uptick rule disappears due to the smoothness of the predictor that makes
non-fundamental traders not confident with extreme price deviations from the fundamental
value. Indeed, the expectations of large price deviations produced by the uptick rule force
the non-fundamental trader to believe in the fundamental value with the effect of reducing,
instead of increasing, the price deviations. The stabilizing effect however vanishes when
traders become highly sensitive in switching to the strategy with best recent performance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 briefly reviews the unconstrained as-
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set pricing model, summarizing from [Brock and Hommes, 1998] and setting the notation
and most of the modeling equations that will be used in next Sections. Section 2.2 is
also preliminary and recaps the concept of fundamental equilibrium, including its stability
analysis and some new results. Section 2.3 formulates the piecewise-smooth model con-
strained by the uptick rule, and discusses the existence and stability of fundamental and
non-fundamental equilibria. So far, no explicit price predictors is introduced, whereas Sec-
tion 2.4 presents the price predictors for which the unconstrained and constrained models
will be studied and compared in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 presents the analytical results
concerning the existence and stability of fixed points. Some of the results concerning the
unconstrained model are new and interesting per se. Section 4 presents a series of nu-
merical tests, confirming the analytical results and investigating non-stationary (periodic,
quasi-periodic, and chaotic) regimes. In Section 4.3 we discuss in detail our economic
findings. Section 5 concludes and lists a series of related interesting topics for further
research. All the analytical results presented in Sections 2 and 3 are proved in Appendix
6.
2 The ARED asset pricing model with and without the
uptick rule
We consider the asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs and adaptive traders in-
troduced by [Brock and Hommes, 1998]. While in the original model a zero supply of
outside shares was considered, making short selling essential to ensure the exchanges, we
consider the case of positive supply, so that short selling will no longer be necessary and
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a constraint on it can be imposed. In this generalized version of the original model, we
introduce a negative demand constraint according to the uptick rule, in order to study the
effects of this regulation on price fluctuations.
2.1 The unconstrained ARED asset pricing model
Consider a financial market where traders invest either in a single risky asset, supplied in
S shares 7 of (ex-dividend) price pt at period t, or in a risk free asset perfectly elastically
supplied at gross return R (where R = 1 + r, with r ∈ (0, 1)). The risky asset pays
random dividend y˜t in period t, where the divided process y˜t is IID (Identically Indepen-
dently Distributed) with Et [y˜t+1] = y¯ constant. Thus, denoting by Wh,t the economic
wealth of a generic trader of type h at the beginning of period t, and by zh,t the number of
shares held by the trader in period t, we have the following wealth equation (or individual
intertemporal budget constraint):
W˜h,t+1 = R(Wh,t− ptzh,t) + p˜t+1zh,t + y˜t+1zh,t = RWh,t + (p˜t+1 + y˜t+1−Rpt)zh,t, (1)
where tilde denotes random variables, Wh,t − ptzh,t is the amount of money invested in
the risk free asset in period t and R˜t+1 = p˜t+1 + y˜t+1 − Rpt is the excess return per share
realized at the end of the period.
Let Eh,t, Vh,t denote the "beliefs" of investor of type h about the conditional expecta-
tion and conditional variance of wealth. They are assumed to be functions of past prices
and dividends. We assume that each investor type is a myopic mean variance maximizer,
7S is in fact the supply of traded assets in each period. Obviously when short selling is allowed assets
are borrowed outside the pool of this S shares making the total supply higher than S.
11
so for type h the demand for shares zh,t solves
max
zh,t
ß
Eh,t
Ä
W˜t+1
ä− a
2
Vh,t
Ä
W˜t+1
ä™
i.e.,
zh,t (pt) =
Eh,t[R˜t+1]
aVh,t[R˜t+1]
=
Eh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]−Rpt
aVh,t[R˜t+1]
,
where a is the risk aversion coefficient and pt is to be determined by the market clearing
between all demands and the supply S of shares. For simplicity (as done in [Brock and
Hommes, 1998], see [Gaunersdorfer, 2000], for an extension), we assume that traders have
common and constant beliefs about the variance, i.e. Vh,t
î
R˜t+1
ó
= σ2, ∀h, and common
and correct beliefs about the dividend, i.e. Eh,t [y˜t+1] = Et [y˜t+1] = y¯, ∀h. Moreover, the
number N of traders and S of supplied shares in each period (not considering the extra
supply of shares due to short sales) are kept constant. Let H be the number of available
"beliefs" or price predictors Eh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1], h = 1, . . . , H , each obtained at a cost Ch,
and denote by nh,t the fraction of traders adopting predictor h in period t, the market
clearing imposes
N
H∑
h=1
nh,tzh,t(pt) = S, zh,t(pt) =
Eh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]−Rpt
aσ2
, (2)
which is solved for pt, thus obtaining
pt =
1
R
(
H∑
h=1
nh,tEh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]− aσ2 S
N
)
, (3)
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Let us substitute the expression of pt in zh,t (pt), ∀h ∈ H , to obtain the actual demands
zh,t =
1
aσ2
(
Eh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]−
H∑
k=1
nk,tEk,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]
)
+
S
N
(4)
(no longer functions of the price pt), and let us use pt to calculate the net profits Rtzh,t−1−
Ch, h = 1, . . . , H , realized in period t.
Eq. (4) gives the number of shares held by a trader of type h in period t. If negative,
the trader is in a short position. If positive, the trader is in a long position.
At this point, the fractions nh,t+1, h = 1, ..., H , for the next period are determined as
functions of the positions of the traders and of the last available net profits. In particular,
the following discrete choice model is used:
nh,t+1 =
exp (β(Rtzh,t−1 − Ch))∑H
k=1 exp (β(Rtzk,t−1 − Ck))
, h = 1, ..., H − 1, (5)
where β measures the intensity of traders’ choice across predictors (traders’ adaptability).
The above procedure can then be iterated to compute the next price pt+1.
If all agents have common beliefs on the future prices, i.e. Eh,t = Et ∀h, the pricing
equation (3) reduces to
Rpt = Et[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1]− aσ2 S
N
.
This equation admits a unique solution p˜∗t ≡ p¯, where
p¯ =
y¯ − aσ2S/N
R− 1 , (6)
that satisfies the "no bubbles" condition limt→∞ (Ep˜∗t/R
t) = 0. This price, given as
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the discounted sum of expected future dividends, would prevail in a perfectly rational
world and is called the fundamental price (see, e.g., [Hommes, 2001, Hommes et al.,
2005]). Of course, we assume p¯ > 0, i.e., sufficiently high dividend y¯ or limited supply of
ouside shares per investor S/N . Given the assumptions about the dividend process and the
fundamental price and focusing only on the deterministic skeleton of the model, i.e. y˜t = y¯
∀t, we have that Eh,t[p˜t+1 + y˜t+1] = Eh[pt+1] + y¯, where the price predictors Eh[pt+1],
h = 1, . . . , H , are deterministic functions of L known past prices {pt−1, pt−2, . . . , pt−L},
L ≥ 1.
It is useful to rewrite the model in terms of price deviations from a benchmark price p¯.
In the following, let s = S/N and denote by xt the price deviation from the fundamental
value, i.e., xt = pt− p¯. Defining the traders’ beliefs on the next deviation xt+1 as fh(xt) =
Eh[pt+1] − p¯, with xt = (xt−1, xt−2, . . . , xt−L) being the vector of the last L available
deviations, the demand functions to be used in the market clearing in Eq. (2) become
zh,t(xt) =
fh(xt)−Rxt
aσ2
+ s, (7)
while the pricing equation (3) and the actual demands (4) can be written in deviations as
xt =
1
R
H∑
h=1
nh,tfh(xt) and zh,t =
1
aσ2
(
fh(xt)−
H∑
k=1
nk,tfk(xt)
)
+ s, (8)
and the excess of return in (5) can be expressed in deviations as
Rt = xt −Rxt−1 + δt + aσ2s. (9)
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where δt = yt − y¯ is a shock due to the dividend realization. As mentioned above, we
focus on the deterministic skeleton of the model, i.e., we fix δt = 0 ∀t.
Substituting Eqs. (7) and (9) into (5) and coupling the pricing equation in (8) with (5),
the ARED model can be rewritten as
xt =
1
R
H∑
h=1
nh,tfh(xt), (10a)
nh,t+1 =
exp
Å
β
Å
(xt −Rxt−1 + aσ2s)
Å
fh(xt−1)−Rxt−1
aσ2
+ s
ã
− Ch
ãã
H∑
k=1
exp
Å
β
Å
(xt −Rxt−1 + aσ2s)
Å
fk(xt−1)−Rxt−1
aσ2
+ s
ã
− Ck
ãã , h = 1, . . . ,H − 1
(10b)
(recall that
∑H
h=1 nh,t = 1). Given the current composition nh,t of the traders’ popula-
tion, the first equation computes the price deviation for period t, while the second updates
the traders’ fractions for the next period. The past deviations (xt−1, xt−2, . . . , xt−(L+1))
appearing in vectors xt and xt−1, together with the fractions nh,t, h = 1, . . . , H − 1,
constitute the state of the system8.
The initial condition is composed of the opening price deviation x0 and of the traders’
fractions nh,1, h = 1, ..., H , to be used in the first period. In fact, assuming that each
price predictor can be customized to the case when the number of past available prices is
less then L, then Eq. (10a) can be applied at t = 1 (to determine the price deviation x1 in
period 1), whereas Eq.s (10b) can only be applied at t = 2, so that nh,2 = nh,1 is used. For
t > L the price predictors in Eqs. (10) can be regularly applied.
8Note that, by writing Eq. (10b) for nh,t and substituting it into Eq. (10a), one can write xt as a recursion
on the last L + 2 deviations. This gives a more compact and homogeneous system’s state (L + 2 price
deviations instead of L + 1 deviations and H − 1 traders’ fractions), however, the formulation (10) is
physically more appropriate and easier to initialize.
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Note that Eq. (10a) guarantees a positive price for any period t (i.e., xt > −p¯), provided
all price predictions are such (fh(xt) > −p¯ for all h = 1, . . . , H).
When there are only two types of traders, H = 2, it is convenient to express the
fractions n1,t and n2,t as a function of mt = n1,t − n2,t ∈ (−1, 1), i.e.,
n1,t =
1 +mt
2
and n2,t =
1−mt
2
. (11)
In this specific case, model (10) can be rewritten as
xt =
1
2R
((1 +mt)f1(xt) + (1−mt)f2(xt)) , (12a)
mt+1 = tanh
Ç
β
2
Ç
(xt −Rxt−1 + aσ2s)f1(xt−1)− f2(xt−1)
aσ2
− (C1 − C2)
åå
,
(12b)
where (xt−1, xt−2, . . . , xt−(L+1),mt) is the system’s state and (x0,m1) identifies the initial
condition.
2.2 The fundamental equilibrium
The following lemma gives the condition under which the fundamental price is an equilib-
rium of model (10) (or model (12) when H = 2):
Lemma 1 If all predictors satisfy fh(0) = 0, h = 1, . . . , H , with 0 the vector of L zeros,
then (x¯(0), n¯(0)h ) with
x¯(0) = 0 and n¯(0)h =
exp (−βCh))∑H
k=1 exp (−βCk))
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[or (x¯(0), m¯(0)) with m¯(0) = tanh (−β/2 (C1 − C2)) if H = 2] is a fixed point of model
(10) [(12)], at which all strategies equally demand z¯(0)h = s. We call this steady state
fundamental equilibrium. H of the associated eigenvalues are zero and the remaining L
ones are the roots of the characteristic equation
λL − γ1λL−1 + · · · − γL = 0, γi = 1
R
H∑
h=1
n¯h
∂
∂xt−i
fh(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣
xt=0
, i = 1, . . . , L.
Lemma 1 also reveals that the price dynamics is not reversible, at least locally to the
fundamental equilibrium (due to the presence of zero eigenvalues), so that prices cannot
be reconstructed backward in time.
We now state a simple condition that rules out the possibility of other equilibria:
Lemma 2 If fh(x¯1)/x¯ < R [or if fh(x¯1)/x¯ > R] for all h = 1, . . . , H and x¯ 6= 0, with
1 the vector of L ones, then the fundamental equilibrium is the only fixed point of model
(10).
As we will recall in Section 2.4, traders with price predictors such that |fh(x¯1)/x¯| < 1
believe that tomorrow’s price will revert to its fundamental value (xt → 0), whereas, at
an equilibrium, trend followers obviously extrapolate the equilibrium price, so their price
predictors are such that fh(x¯1)/x¯ = 1. Lemma 2 therefore shows that non-fundamental
equilibria are possible only in the presence of at least one of the two mentioned types of
traders and traders that believe that nonzero price deviations will amplify in the short run,
even if they have been recently constant.
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2.3 The ARED asset pricing model constrained by the uptick rule
When trading restrictions imposed by the uptick-rule are introduced, we must distinguish
between two situations: if prices are rising, e.g. we simply look at the last movement
available xt−1 − xt−2, then short selling is allowed and the unconstrained model (10) still
applies. In contrast, in a downward (or stationary) movement (xt−1 ≤ xt−2), traders’
demands are forced to be non-negative, i.e., the demand functions to be used in the market
clearing in Eq. (2) are
zh,t(xt) = max
®
0,
fh(xt)−Rxt
aσ2
+ s
´
. (13)
Note that the forward dynamics remain uniquely defined. In fact, given the past price devi-
ations in xt and the traders’ fractions nh,t, the per capita demand d(xt) =
∑H
h=1 nh,tzh,t(xt)
is a piecewise-linear, continuous function of the deviation xt, that is decreasing up to
the deviation at which it vanishes together with the highest of the single agents’ demand
curves, and d(xt) = 0 for larger deviations (see Figure (1)). There is therefore a unique
deviation xt at which the market clears, i.e., d(xt) = s > 0. Also note that, given the
same traders’ fractions, the constrained price9 is higher than the unconstrained price10
9In this part of the paper we introduce the notation xU,t for the unconstrained price determined by model
in Section 2.1 to distinguish it from the constrained price xt. Since there is no risk of confusion, this
distinction is not made in other parts of the paper for the sake of avoiding cumbersome notations.
10It is clear that all the traders’ demand functions are always characterized by the same slope. However,
the intercept of the demands with the x = 0 axis, i.e. s + fh(xt)aσ2 , changes over time and it depends on
the past share prices. For example if the predictor of a trader is based on L past prices of the share, i.e.
xt = (xt−1, ..., xt−L), the intercept of its demand with the x = 0 axis depends on all of these prices.
Thus, to prove that the constrained prices are always higher than the unconstrained one given the same past
prices, it does not necessarily mean a price dynamic characterized by larger fluctuations for the constrained
model. The situation can be the opposite when we consider predictors based on a large number of past
deviations and especially when they are non-linear. In other words, simple static considerations on the shape
of the constrained demands do not help us to understand entirely the effect of the uptick rule on the price
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θz2,t
tan θ = −NR
aσ2s (f1(xt) = 0)
s+
f2(xt)
aσ2
s+
f3(xt)
aσ2
z1,t
z3,t
d
xxt xU,t
Figure 1: Per-capita demand (d, red) and supply (s, blue) curves as functions of the price deviation x to
be realized in period t. A case with H = 3 types of traders is sketched, where z1,t is the demand of
"fundamentalists" (see Sect. 2.4), while z2,t and z3,t are the demands of "non-fundamentalists" (f2(xt) > 0,
f3(xt) < 0, and negative (dashed) demands are obtained with (7)). The resulting per capita demand curve
is piecewise-linear, continuous, and decreasing. Depending on the traders’ fractions (n1,t, n2,t, n3,t), it can
take on different configurations in the shaded area (the most negative of which corresponds to z3,t when
n3,t = 1; the case shown corresponds to n1,t = n2,t = n3,t = 1/3). At the unconstrained price xU,t traders
of type 3 are in a short position in period t.
(xt > xU,t), so that positive predictions (fh(xt) > −p¯ for all h = 1, . . . , H) still yield
positive prices (xt > −p¯).
When solving Eq. (2) for xt with the constrained demands (13), 2H − 1 cases must
be further distinguished, depending on which of the optimal demands in (7) are forced to
zero by (13) (obviously not all demands can vanish). The uniqueness of forward dynamics
guarantees that only one of the cases clears the market.
For simplicity, hereafter we will only consider the case with two types of traders (H =
2), so one of the following three cases is realized at each period:
0: no trader is prohibited from going short (equivalently, both types of traders hold
dynamics.
19
nonnegative amounts of shares in period t), i.e.,
(7) implies z1,t ≥ 0 and z2,t ≥ 0, with xt = 1
R
(n1,t f1(xt) + n2,t f2(xt)),
1: traders of type 1 are prohibited from going short (only traders of type 2 hold shares
in period t), i.e.,
(7) implies z1,t < 0 and z2,t > 0, with xt =
1
R
Ç
f2(xt)− aσ2sn1,t
n2,t
å
,
2: traders of type 2 are prohibited from going short (only traders of type 1 hold shares
in period t), i.e.,
(7) implies z1,t > 0 and z2,t < 0, with xt =
1
R
Ç
f1(xt)− aσ2sn2,t
n1,t
å
.
Then, mt+1 must be computed (see (11)) and, again, there are three cases, depending
on the signs of the optimal demands at period (t − 1) (see Eq. (5)). In order to simplify
the model formulation, we prefer to enlarge the system’s state, by including the traders’
demands zh,t−1 realized in period (t − 1), h = 1, 2, in lieu of the farthest price deviation
xt−(L+1). The state variables therefore are
(xt−1, xt−2, . . . , xt−L, z1,t−1, z2,t−1, mt) if L ≥ 2, (14a)
(xt−1, xt−2, z1,t−1, z2,t−1, mt) if L = 1, (14b)
as we need xt−2 to apply the uptick rule, and we can update the traders’ fractions by simply
replacing (12b) with
mt+1 = tanh
Ç
β
2
Ä
(xt −Rxt−1 + aσ2s)(z1,t−1 − z2,t−1)− (C1 − C2)
äå
. (15)
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The uptick rule makes the ARED model piecewise smooth, namely the space of the
state variables is partitioned into three regions associated with different equations for up-
dating the system’s state (see [di Bernardo et al., 2008] and references therein). By defin-
ing the regions
U : xt−1 > xt−2,
Z0 : xt−1 ≤ xt−2, z1,t ≥ 0, z2,t ≥ 0,
Z1 : xt−1 ≤ xt−2, z1,t < 0, z2,t > 0,
Z2 : xt−1 ≤ xt−2, z1,t > 0, z2,t < 0,
(16a)
where
z1,t =
1−mt
2
f1(xt)− f2(xt)
aσ2
+ s and z2,t =
1 +mt
2
f2(xt)− f1(xt)
aσ2
+ s (16b)
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are the optimal demands from (8), we can write the forward dynamics as follows:
xt =

1
2R
((1 +mt)f1(xt) + (1−mt)f2(xt)) if (xt,mt) ∈ U ∪ Z0,
1
R
Ç
f2(xt)− aσ2s 1 +mt
1−mt
å
if (xt,mt) ∈ Z1,
1
R
Ç
f1(xt)− aσ2s 1−mt
1 +mt
å
if (xt,mt) ∈ Z2,
(17a)
z1,t =

1−mt
2
f1(xt)− f2(xt)
aσ2
+ s if (xt,mt) ∈ U ∪ Z0,
0 if (xt,mt) ∈ Z1,
2s
1 +mt
if (xt,mt) ∈ Z2,
(17b)
z2,t =

1 +mt
2
f2(xt)− f1(xt)
aσ2
+ s if (xt,mt) ∈ U ∪ Z0,
2s
1−mt if (xt,mt) ∈ Z1,
0 if (xt,mt) ∈ Z2,
(17c)
mt+1 = tanh
Ç
β
2
Ä
(xt −Rxt−1 + aσ2s)(z1,t−1 − z2,t−1)− (C1 − C2)
äå
. (17d)
The same model can be rewritten in compact notations as follows:
(xt, z1,t, z2,t,mt+1) =

G1 (xt, z1,t−1, z2,t−1,mt) if (xt,mt) ∈ U ∪ Z0,
G2 (xt, z1,t−1, z2,t−1,mt) if (xt,mt) ∈ Z1,
G3 (xt, z1,t−1, z2,t−1,mt) if (xt,mt) ∈ Z2,
(18)
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Figure 2: Partition of the state space into the three regions U ∪ Z0 (green) and Zh, h = 1, 2 (pink): the
projection on the (xt−1, xt−2) space in the case where traders use the fundamental and chartist predictors
(see Section 2.4).
where G1, G2 and G3 are three systems that define the asset pricing model with uptick
rule.
Region U ∪ Z0 is separated from region Zh, h = 1, 2, by the two boundaries
∂Uh : xt−1 = xt−2, zh,t ≤ 0 and ∂Zh : xt−1 ≤ xt−2, zh,t = 0 (19)
(see Figure (2), where a projection on the (xt−1, xt−2) space is shown). Across boundary
∂Uk the system is discontinuous, i.e., the corresponding expressions on the right-hand
sides of (17a–c) assume different values on ∂Uk. In contrast, the system is continuous (but
not differentiable) at the boundaries ∂Zh.
Similarly to the unconstrained model (10), the initial condition of model (17) is set by
the opening price deviation x0 and the traders’ initial compositionm1. However, Eq. (17d)
also requires the traders’ demand z1,0 and z2,0 which can be conventionally set at s.
Finally, let’s discuss the fixed points of model (17) (or equivalently (18)), which neces-
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sarily lie on the boundary of region U and are still denoted with the pair (x¯, m¯) (the equi-
librium demands, which also characterize the equilibria of model (17), can be obtained
from Eqs. (17b,c)). Each of the three systems defining model (17), system G1 (equivalent
to model (10) adding the demands as state variables) which defines the dynamics of the
model in region U ∪ Z0 and the two systems, G1 and G2, which define the dynamics of
the model in regions Z1 and Z2, respectively, have their own fixed points, which we call
either admissible or virtual according to the region of the state space in which they are.
In this paper, a generic fixed point or equilibrium of system G1 is called admissible if it
lies in region U ∪ Z0 and virtual otherwise, a generic fixed point of system G2 is called
admissible if it lies in region Z1 and virtual otherwise, and a generic fixed point of system
G3 is called admissible if it lies in region Z2 and virtual otherwise. Virtual fixed points are
not equilibria of model (17), but tracking their position is useful in the analysis.
The fundamental equilibrium is always an admissible fixed point of system G1, also
called the unconstrained system because equivalent to model (10) adding the demands as
state variables. Indeed, it lies on the boundary between regions U and Z0, with positive
demands (equal to s), i.e., it is always an interior point of region U∪Z0. Its local stability is
therefore ruled by Lemma 1 (the storage of the previous demands in lieu of the farthest past
deviation brings the number of zero eigenvalues to 2H−1, 2H if L = 1, see (14b)), while
the existence of (admissible or virtual) non-fundamental equilibria of the unconstrained
system G1 is ruled by Lemma 2.
The fixed points of the other two systems, G2 and G3, are of little interest. They lie
on the boundaries ∂U2 and ∂U1, respectively, across which model (17) is discontinuous.
Hence, there are arbitrarily small perturbations from the fixed point entering region U , for
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which the unconstrained system G1 will map the system’s state far from the fixed point.
The fixed points of the two systems G2 and G3 are therefore (highly) unstable and will not
be considered in the analysis.
2.4 Classical price predictors
In this Section we briefly introduce the price predictors used in this paper (see, e.g., [Elder,
1993], [Chiarella and He, 2002], and [Chiarella and He, 2003], for a more complete survey
of the most classical types of price predictors used in the literature). The first one, f1(xt),
called fundamental predictor, will be paired with each of the others, the non-fundamental
predictors, in the analysis of Sections 3 and 4. For this reason, all non-fundamental pre-
dictors will be denoted by f2(xt).
Fundamental predictor
Fundamental traders, or fundamentalists, believe that prices return to their fundamental
value. The simplest fundamental prediction is the fundamental price for period t + 1,
irrespectively of the recent trend:
E1[pt+1] = p¯, f1(xt) = 0. (20)
More generally, fundamentalists believe that prices will revert to the fundamental value by
a factor v at each period:
E1[pt+1] = p¯+ v(pt−1 − p¯), f1(xt) = vxt−1, 0 ≤ v < 1, (21)
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the smaller is v, the highest is the expected speed of convergence to the fundamental price.
As in [Brock and Hommes, 1998], we assume that "training" costs must be borne to
obtain enough "understanding" of how markets work in order to believe in the fundamental
price, so fundamentalists incur into a cost C1 > 0 at each prediction.
Chartist predictor
The second type of simple trader that we consider is called chartist or trend chaser. This
type of trader believes that any mispricing will continue, i.e. the chartist predictor is
formally equivalent to predictor (21):
E2[pt+1] = p¯+ g(pt−1 − p¯), f2(xt) = gxt−1, g > 1, (22)
but amplifies, instead of damping, nonzero price deviations from the fundamental.
The chartist prediction is not costly.
Rate of change (ROC) predictor
The third type of simple trader that we consider is called "nonlinear technical analyst" or
"ROC trader".
The ROC ("Price Rate Of Change") is a nonlinear prediction which applies the price
rate of change averaged over the last L− 1 periods,
ROC =
Ç
pt−1
pt−L
å 1
L−1
=
Ç
p¯+ xt−1
p¯+ xt−L
å 1
L−1
, L ≥ 2, (23a)
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to pt−1 twice to extrapolate pt+1:
E2[pt+1] = pt−1ROC2, f2(xt) = (p¯+ xt−1)ROC2 − p¯. (23b)
The ROC predictor is typically "smoothed” to avoid extreme rates of change (rates that
are either too high or too close to zero, see Smoothed-ROC or S-ROC predictors in [Elder,
1993]). This interprets the traders’ rationality that makes them diffident with extreme rates.
We adopt in particular the confidence mechanism introduced in [Dercole and Cecchetto,
2010], where the ROC is combined with the last available price. Precisely, the price rate
of change to be applied is a convex combination of the actual ROC (23a) and the unitary
rate (corresponding to the last available price), with the ROC weight αROC that vanishes
when the ROC attains extreme values (zero and infinity):
E2[pt+1] = pt−1 (αROCROC + (1− αROC))2 ,
f2(xt) = (p¯+ xt−1) (αROCROC + (1− αROC))2 − p¯. (23c)
The function
αROC =
2
ROCα + ROC−α
(23d)
has been used in the analysis, where the parameter 1/α measures how confident traders
are with extreme rates.
The ROC predictor and the S-ROC predictor are not costly.
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3 The effect of the uptick rule on shares price fluctua-
tions: Analytical results
In this Section we report the stability analysis of fundamental and non-fundamental equi-
libria of models (12) and (17) for two pairs of traders’ types. As traditionally done in
the literature, type 1 is always the fundamental type (price predictor (21)), while type two
is either the chartist in Sect. 3.1 (predictor (22)) or the nonlinear technical analyst (ROC
trader) in Sect. 3.2 (predictor (23a,c,d)).
3.1 Fundamentalists vs chartists
Consider models (12) and (17) with predictors (21) and (22). Model (12, 21, 22) is the
classical ARED model, proposed and fully analyzed in [Brock and Hommes, 1998] for
the case of zero supply of outside shares, i.e., s = 0, where short selling is intrinsically
practiced at each trading period. The case with positive supply is analyzed in [Anufriev
and Tuinstra, 2009], where the effects of a negative bound on the traders’ positions are
also investigated.
Without any constraint on short selling, the existence and stability of the fixed points
of model (12, 21, 22) are defined in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The following statements hold true for the dynamical system (12) with predic-
tors (21) and (22):
1. For 1 < g < R the fundamental equilibrium (0, m¯(0)) (see Lemma 1) is the only
fixed point and is globally stable.
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2. For R < g < 2R− v there are the following possibilities:
(a) For 0 ≤ β < βLP = 1
C
log
Ç
R− v
g−R
å(
1 +
aσ2s2
4C
g− v
R− 1
)−1
> 0 the fundamen-
tal equilibrium is the only fixed point and is stable.
(LP) At β = βLP two equilibria appear (as β increases) at
x¯LP =
aσ2s
2(R−1) > 0, m¯ = 1− 2
R− v
g − v ,
through a saddle-node bifurcation (limit point, LP).
(b) For βLP < β < min
®
βTR =
1
C
log
Ç
R− v
g−R
å
, β
(+)
NS
´
> βLP the fundamental
equilibrium is locally (asymptotically) stable and coexists with the two non-
fundamental equilibria (x¯(±), m¯), with
x¯(±) = x¯LP ±
Ã(
x¯2LP +
aσ2C
(R−1)(g− v)
)Ç
1− βLP
β
å
.
Equilibrium (x¯(+), m¯) is locally (asymptotically) stable, whereas (x¯(−), m¯) is a
saddle with 2-dimensional stable manifold separating the basins of attraction
of the two stable equilibria.
(TR) At β = βTR, (x¯(−), m¯) collides and exchanges stability with the fundamen-
tal equilibrium (transcritical bifurcation, TR). The fundamental equilibrium is
always at least locally (asymptotically) stable for β < βTR and it is always
unstable for β > βTR.
(NS(+)) At β = β(+)NS the equilibrium (x¯
(+), m¯) undergoes a Neimark-Sacker (NS) bi-
furcation. No explicit expression is available for β(+)NS , but βTR ≶ β
(+)
NS if
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βTR ≶
1
aσ2s2
(R− 1)2
(g−R)(R− v) .
(c) For βTR < β < β
(−)
NS > βTR the fundamental equilibrium is a saddle, with
2-dimensional stable manifold separating the positive from the negative dy-
namics, and the equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯), with x¯(−)< 0, is stable.
(NS(−)) At β = β(−)NS the equilibrium (x¯
(−), m¯) undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurca-
tion.
3. For g > 2R− v there are the following possibilities:
(a) For 0 ≤ β < β(±)NS the fundamental equilibrium is unstable and the equilibria
(x¯(±), m¯) (x¯(+)> 0 and x¯(−)< 0) are stable.
(NS) At β = β(±)NS the equilibria (x¯
(±), m¯) undergo a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
4. For g > R2 the dynamics can be unbounded for sufficiently large β.
Lemma 3 generalizes Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 in [Brock and Hommes, 1998] to the case
s > 0, 0 < v < 1, and Proposition 3.1 in [Anufriev and Tuinstra, 2009]. In particular, for
s = 0, note that the saddle-node and transcritical bifurcations concomitantly occur (case 2)
at a so-called pitchfork bifurcation, whereas the mechanism making the fundamental equi-
librium unstable is different for s > 0. First, the two non-fundamental equilibria (x¯(±), m¯)
appear (as the traders’ adaptability β increases) through the saddle-node bifurcation, and
as β increases further a transcritical bifurcation occurs in which the saddle (x¯(−), m¯) ex-
changes stability with the fundamental equilibrium. Thus, for βLP < β < βTR, the fun-
damental equilibrium is stable, but coexists with an alternative stable fixed point of model
(12, 21, 22).
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With the uptick-rule, the existence and stability of the fixed points of model (17, 21, 22)
are complemented by the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The following statements hold true for the dynamical system (17) with predic-
tors (21) and (22):
1. The local and global stability of the fundamental equilibrium is as in Lemma 3. As
long as equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) exist and are admissible, their local stability is as in
Lemma 3. Equilibrium (x¯(+), m¯) is admissible iff x¯(+) ≤ x¯(+)BC = aσ2s/(R − v).
Equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) is admissible iff x¯(−)BC = −aσ2s/(g−R) ≤ x¯(−) ≤ x¯(+)BC .
2. For R < g < 2R− v there are the following possibilities:
(a) If R+v > 2, equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) appear admissible at β = βLP and (x¯(+), m¯)
becomes virtual (border-collision bifurcation) at β = β(+)BC , with
0 < β
(+)
BC =
1
C
log
Ç
R− v
g−R
å(
1 +
aσ2s2
C
(g− v)(1− v)
(R− v)2
)−1
< βTR.
(b) If R + v < 2, equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) appear virtual at β = βLP and (x¯(−), m¯)
becomes admissible at β = β(+)BC .
(c) IfR+v = 2, equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) appear on the border ∂Z1 at β = βLP = β
(+)
BC
and (x¯(+), m¯) and (x¯(−), m¯) are respectively virtual and admissible for larger
β.
(d) If s < s(−)BC =
(
C
aσ2
(g −R)2
(g − v)(g − 1)
)1/2
, equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) becomes virtual
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at β = β(−)BC , with
β
(−)
BC =
1
C
log
Ç
R− v
g−R
å(
1− aσ
2s2
C
(g− v)(g− 1)
(g−R)2
)−1
> βTR.
3. For g > 2R− v there are the following possibilities:
(a) If s < s(−)BC equilibria (x¯
(±), m¯) are virtual for any β ≥ 0.
(b) If s > s(−)BC equilibrium (x¯
(+), m¯) is virtual for any β ≥ 0, whereas (x¯(−), m¯)
is admissible for β > β(−)BC > 0.
4. For g > R2 the dynamics can be unbounded for sufficiently large β.
Note that the uptick rule affects the price dynamics also when the supply of outside
shares is large. Indeed, independently on s, there is always an equilibrium, (x¯(+), m¯) or
(x¯(−), m¯), becoming virtual as β increases or decreases.
3.2 Fundamentalists vs ROC traders
Consider models (12) and (17) with the fundamental predictor (21) and with the ROC
predictor (23a,b) or (23a,c,d).
Note that both predictors are such that fh(x¯1)/x¯ < R for any possible equilibrium
(x¯, m¯) with x¯ 6= 0, so by means of Lemma 2 the fundamental equilibrium is the only fixed
point. In the simplest case L = 2, its stability is characterized in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 The following statements hold true for the dynamical systems (12) and (17)
with predictors (21) and (23a,b), as well as with predictors (21) and (23a,c,d):
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1. For R ≥ 2 the fundamental equilibrium (0, m¯(0)) (see Lemma 1) is a stable fixed
point for any β > 0.
2. For R < 2 the fundamental equilibrium is stable for
0 < β < βNS =
1
C
log
Ç
R
2−R
å
and loses stability through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at β = βNS.
Similarly to the cases where chartists are paired with fundamentalists (Sect. 3.1), the
stability of the fundamental equilibrium is guaranteed if the gross return R is sufficiently
large.
The stability analysis for L > 2 is possible, following the lines indicated in [Kuruklis,
1994], and the general conclusion is that rates of change calculated on larger windows of
past prices stabilize the fundamental equilibrium, up to the point that the fixed point is
stable for any value of β if L is sufficiently large.
4 The effect of the uptick rule on share price fluctuations:
Numerical simulations.
In the first two Subsections of this Section we report several numerical analysis of models
(12) and (17) for the two pairs of traders’ types considered in Sect. 3, with the aim of char-
acterizing the non-stationary (periodic, quasi-periodic, or chaotic) asymptotic regimes.
This part contains technical considerations. In the last subsection, we discuss the effects
of the uptick rule on the price dynamics.
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As done in most of the related works in the literature, we use the traders’ adaptability
(or intensity of choice) β as a bifurcation parameter (two- or higher-dimensional bifur-
cation analyses are possible, see, e.g., [Dercole and Cecchetto, 2010], but will not be
considered here). For each considered value of β, the transient dynamics is eliminated by
computing the (largest) Lyapunov exponent associated to the orbit11, i.e., we delete the
number of initial iterations required to compute the largest Lyapunov exponent, whereas
the asymptotic regime is discussed. To graphically study the bifurcations underwent by
the different attractors, we vertically plot the deviations xt in the attractor at the corre-
sponding value of β, together with the associated largest Lyapunov exponent L (see, e.g.,
Figure (3)).
In each simulation, we set the initial condition as follows. The opening price deviation
x0 is randomly selected in a small, positive or negative neighborhood of zero to study the
stability of the fundamental equilibrium; far from zero to study non-fundamental attrac-
tors. The initial traders’ fractions are equally set (m1 = 0, i.e., n1,1 = n2,1 = 1/2). For
model (17), the initial values assigned to the traders’ demands z1,0 and z2,0 are irrelevant,
as the traders’ fractions are not updated at t = 1.
4.1 Fundamentalists vs chartists
We first study the effects of a positive supply of outside shares (s > 0) on the dynamics
of the original model (12, 20, 22) introduced by [Brock and Hommes, 1998], then we
study the effects of the uptick rule. Figure (3) reports the bifurcation diagrams and the
11The largest Lyapunov exponent is a measure of the mean divergence of nearby trajectories; it is positive,
zero, and negative in chaotic, quasi-periodic, and periodic (or stationary) regimes, respectively [Alligood
et al., 1997].
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams of model (12, 20, 22) for different values of s (the supply of outside shares of
the risky asset): A (first row, left column) s = 0, in this case βTR = βLP = βPF, related (largest) Lyapunov
exponents in (second row, left column); B (first row, right column) s = 0.1, in this case βTR < β
(+)
NS , related
(largest) Lyapunov exponents in (second row, right column); C (third row, left column) s = 0.2, in this case
βTR = β
(+)
NS , related (largest) Lyapunov exponents (fourth row, left column); D (third row, right column)
s = 0.3, in this case βTR > β
(+)
NS , related (largest) Lyapunov exponents (fourth row, right column). β
(+)
NS
and β(−)NS are not ticked because there is no analytical expression for them. However, the Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation values can be clearly identified in the bifurcation diagrams. Other parameter values: R = 1.1,
a = 1, σ = 1, y¯ = 1, g = 1.2, C = 1.
corresponding largest Lyapunov exponent obtained for four different values of s (with s
in the range of values commonly used in the literature, see [Anufriev and Tuinstra, 2009,
Hommes et al., 2005]). The first panel is the case with zero supply of outside shares
(s = 0) and is included for comparison.
The bifurcation points βLP, βTR, and βNS are indicated, together with the non-fundamental
equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) (the gray parabola), and are in agreement with the analytical results of
Lemma 3. In particular, βLP = βTR = βPF indicates a pitchfork bifurcation when s = 0.
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Note that the positive and negative deviation dynamics are separated in model (12, 20, 22).
Indeed, due to the characteristics of the chartist predictor (22), if the opening price is above
[below] the fundamental value (x0 > 0 [x0 < 0]), it will remain so forever (see Eq. (12a)).
The positive and negative attractors therefore coexist (with basins of attraction separated
by the linear manifold xt−1 = 0 in state space), so that two Lyapunov exponents (one for
each of the two attractors) are plotted.
As expected, the fundamental equilibrium is destabilized for sufficiently high traders’
adaptability and the amplitude of the price fluctuations increases as β increases. But the
amplitude of fluctuations also increases with the supply of outside shares of the risky asset
s (note the different vertical scales in Figure (3)). The latter effect is partially due to the
risk premium, i.e. (aσ2s), required by traders for holding extra shares that modifies the
performance measures of the trading strategies.
Figure (3) shows another interesting dynamical phenomenon. For sufficiently high
supply of outside shares of the risky asset (s = 0.3 in case D), the positive attractor, that
appears at the Neimark-Sacker (NS) bifurcation (β(+)NS ) of equilibrium (x¯
(+), m¯), collapses
through a "homoclinic” contact with the saddle equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯). The chaotic be-
havior is then reestablished when the fundamental equilibrium looses stability through the
transcritical bifurcation (βTR).
The analysis of the dynamics conducted up to now reveals that there are not substantial
differences in the price dynamics for different values âA˘N´âA˘N´of s, except the amplitude
of price fluctuations and some peculiar phenomena, such as the homoclinic contact just
discussed. For this reason and to make the discussion more clear and concise, in the
following we investigate the effects of the uptick rule on the price dynamics only for
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagrams of models (12, 20, 22) (left) and (17, 20, 22) (right) and exemplary state
portraits projections in the plane (xt, xt−1). Parameter values as in Figure (3)-case(B). The light gray
represents the attractor of negative deviations and the corresponding largest Lyapunov exponent. The dark
gray represents the attractor of positive deviations and the corresponding largest Lyapunov exponent. The
black represents the attractor born through a nonsmooth saddle-node bifurcation and the corresponding
largest Lyapunov exponent. The blue dots indicate that fundamentalists cannot have negative positions
because of the uptick rule. The red dots indicate that chartists cannot have negative positions because of the
uptick rule.
s = 0.1.
Figure (4) compares models (12) (left) and (17) (right) with predictors (20) and (22).
The bifurcation diagram and the largest Lyapunov exponents associated with the different
attractors are reported, together with two examples of state portraits (projections in the
plane (xt, xt−1), see bottom panels). Blue and red dots identify the points in the attractor
in which respectively fundamentalists and chartists have been prohibited from going short.
The first thing to remark is that multiple positive attractors are present in the con-
strained dynamics (right column in Figure (4)), i.e. when the uptick rule is in place. In par-
ticular a period-two cycle alternating unrestricted trading with restricted trading in which
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fundamentalists are forced by the uptick rule to take nonnegative positions (black and blue
dots) is present for sufficiently large β. It appears through a nonsmooth saddle-node bi-
furcation and coexists with the chaotic attractor generated through the loss of fundamental
stability. Before the bifurcation the fundamental equilibrium is globally stable (while it is
globally stable in the unconstrained dynamics up to the saddle-node at β = βLP).
Also the bifurcation structure leading to the chaotic attractor is more involved. The
first branch of attractors suddenly appears as β increases. This is probably due to a homo-
clinic contact with the period-two saddle cycle, but this conjecture has not been verified.
This first branch seems to collapse through a collision with the border ∂Z1, in connection
with the border collision of the non-fundamental equilibrium (x¯(+), m¯) at β = β(+)BC . The
remaining thinner attractor later explodes into a larger one, again due to a border collision
with ∂Z1. However, a deeper mathematical investigation would be required to confirm the
above conjectures.
As for the negative equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) (for β > βTR), it loses stability at β = β
(−)
BC
through a border collision with ∂Z2, giving way to a chaotic attractor characterized by
restrictions on chartists.
Figure (5) shows an example of time series on the positive chaotic attractor obtained for
β = 3 (left column: unconstrained dynamics; right column: dynamics constrained by the
uptick rule). The top panels report the price dynamics (black) and the chartist prediction
(red, dashed), with blue and red dots marking the periods in which fundamentalists and
chartists are respectively prevented to go short by the uptick rule (right column). The
remaining panels report, from top to bottom, the returns (Rt = xt − Rxt−1 + aσ2s) and
the traders’ fractions (nh,t), demands (zh,t), and net profits (Uh,t = Rtzh,t−1−Ch, h = 1, 2,
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Figure 5: Positive (i.e. above fundamental) time series on the asymptotic regime of models (12, 20, 22)
(left) and (17, 20, 22) (right) for β = 3. Other parameter values as in Figure (3)-case(B). The blue dots
indicate that fundamentalists cannot have negative positions because of the uptick rule.
blue for fundamentalists and red for chartists).
The price dynamics is characterized by recurrent peaks (financial bubbles), driven by
chartists that expect a price rise and hold the shares of the risky asset and, at the same
time, attenuated by fundamentalists which expect a devaluation and sell short (see the
negative positions of fundamentalists in the unconstrained dynamics, left). In particular,
when the price is closed to its fundamental value, the chartists’ trading strategy is more
profitable because their expectations are confirmed. Chartists dominate the market and the
price is growing until the capital gain cannot compensate for the lower dividend yield. At
this point, chartists start to suffer negative returns, while the short positions of the funda-
mentalists produce profits. Eventually most of traders adopt the fundamentalist’s trading
strategy and the price falls down close to the fundamental value. As soon the price starts to
revert to the fundamental value, however, fundamentalists are prohibited from going short
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in the constrained dynamics because of the uptick rule (right column), and this triggers a
further phase of rising prices. This happens several times, with the result of amplifying the
price peak. At a certain point, when the price is very far away from its fundamental value,
chartists suffer strong losses and the relative fraction of fundamentalists is almost one.
The massive presence of fundamentalists pushes the price close to its fundamental value
and the uptick rule cannot prevent this from happening. Indeed, if there are almost only
fundamentalists, from the pricing equation we have that their demands must be equal to
the supply of outside share, i.e. positive. When the price is close to its fundamental price
chartists start to have a better performance and the story repeats. Despite this mispricing
effect, the frequency of the price peaks is slowed down by the short selling restriction.
Similarly, Figure (6) shows an example of time series on the negative attractor obtained
for β = 4 (here the unconstrained dynamics is quasi-periodic, see Figure (4)). In this case
of negative price deviations, the chartists go short and have, on average, higher profits
than fundamentalists. In the unconstrained dynamics chartists are predominant and drive
prices down. This phenomenon is attenuated by the uptick rule, which limit the downward
price movements and increases the performance of fundamentalists. The frequencies of
the negative peaks is slightly lowered by the short selling restriction, but they are more
irregular due to the presence of chaotic dynamics as indicated by the positivity of the
largest Lyapunov exponent, see Figure (4).
The different types of price dynamics, quasi-periodic for the unconstrained model and
chaotic for the constrained one, are due to the different types of bifurcations through which
the non-fundamental equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) losses stability, a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
in the first case and a border-collision bifurcation in the second. Indeed, as typical in
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Figure 6: Negative (i.e., below fundamental) time series on the asymptotic regime of models (12, 20, 22)
(left) and (17, 20, 22) (right) for β = 4. Other parameter values as in Figure (3)-case(B). The red dots
indicate that chartists cannot have negative positions because of the uptick rule.
piecewise linear model, at the border-collision bifurcation we have sudden transition from
a stable fixed point to a fully developed robust (i.e., without periodic windows) chaotic
attractor, see, e.g. [di Bernardo et al., 2008].
4.2 Fundamentalists vs ROC traders
Figure (7) reports the bifurcation analysis of models (12) (left) and (17) (right) with pre-
dictors (20) and (23a,c,d), while Figure (8) shows the time series on the chaotic attractor
obtained for β = 1.4.
Here the fundamental equilibrium is globally stable up to the Neimark-Sacker bifur-
cation at β ≤ βNS. Interestingly, the price fluctuations showed by the non-stationary
attractors originated for larger β (quasi-periodic with periodic windows and later chaotic)
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Figure 7: Bifurcation diagrams of models (12, 20, 23a,c,d) (left) and (17, 20, 23a,c,d) (right) and exemplary
state portraits projections in the plane (xt, xt−1). Parameter values: α = 10, L = 2, other values as in
Figure (3)-case(B). The blue dots indicate that fundamentalists cannot have negative positions because of
the uptick rule. The red dots indicate that chartists cannot have negative positions because of the uptick rule.
have a remarkably smaller amplitude in the constrained dynamics, than in the unrestricted
case. In this sense, the uptick-rule shows a rather robust stabilizing effect, at least as long
β is not too large, i.e., traders are not fast enough in changing their beliefs to react to past
performances.
This is also evident in the time series of Figure (8), where the short selling restriction
also intensifies the frequency of the price peaks.
4.3 Economic discussion of the numerical results
On the basis of the three declared objectives of the uptick rule, this subsection provides a
discussion of the effects of this short selling regulation in the light of the analytical and by
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Figure 8: Time series on the asymptotic regime of models (12, 20, 23a,c,d) (left) and (17, 20, 23a,c,d) (right)
for β = 1.4. Other parameter values as in Figure (7). The blue dots indicate that fundamentalists cannot
have negative positions because of the uptick rule. The red dots indicate that chartists cannot have negative
positions because of the uptick rule.
numerical analysis reported in the previous Sections.
Let us start to discuss the scenario described by models (12) and (17) with predictors
(21) and (22) (fundamentalists vs chartists). We first consider the case of negative price
deviations (the negative attractor in Figure (4) and the time series in Figure (6)), where we
see that chartists take short positions when prices fall, whereas fundamentalists take long
positions believing that the stock price will rise to reach the fundamental value (see the
unconstrained dynamics in the left column of Figure (6)). It is important to point out that
whenever an asset is undervalued (price below its fundamental value) it should be better to
hold it rather than to sell it because the return is always positive: dividend yield outweighs
the capital gain effect. Indeed, by going short chartists obtain negative excess returns,
see the dynamic of the net profits U2,t in the last row of Figure (6). However chartists
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Figure 9: Time series on the asymptotic regime of models (12, 20, 23a,c,d) (left) and (17, 20, 23a,c,d)
(right) for β = 4.5. Other parameter values as in Figure (7). The red dots indicate that chartists cannot have
negative positions because of the uptick rule.
do better than fundamentalists here because the latter are charged a cost, (C), which is
larger than the profit they obtain by holding the assets, compare the net profits of the two
trading strategies (U1,t and U2,t) again in the last row of Figure (6). It follows that chartists
are predominant in the market, as indicated by the low value of the fraction n1, and their
trading strategy causes downward movements of the stocks’ price. In the constrained dy-
namics (right column), the uptick rule limits the possibility to go short for chartists. This
helps to revert the stock prices toward the fundamental value. It follows a better perfor-
mance for the fundamentalists and their presence in the market increases. As a result, the
short selling restriction reduces the negative peaks reached by stock prices. From this ex-
ample it is clear the effectiveness of the regulation to meet the last two goals established
by the SEC. Moreover, from the analysis of the bifurcation diagram, it is interesting to
note that the negative non-fundamental equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) looses stability in the con-
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strained dynamics at a lower traders’ adaptability, i.e., at a lower value of the parameter
β, respect to the unconstrained dynamics. This is due to the border collision bifurcation
at β = β(−)BC , that occurs before the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at β
(−)
NS responsible of the
instability in the unconstrained dynamics. This might be mathematically interpreted as a
destabilizing effect of the uptick rule. However, the chaotic fluctuations established after
the bifurcation move the prices, on average, closer to the fundamental value with respect
to the equilibrium deviation x¯(−).
Considering the same model and predictors, by the time series of Figure (5) it is possi-
ble to notice that the dynamics of positive price deviations are characterized (for β > β(+)NS )
by frequently financial bubbles. These bubbles are enforced by chartists which overvalued
the stock prices in the upward trend and are attenuated by fundamentalists. In fact, in
these phases of rising prices fundamentalists go short driven by the belief that the price
will revert to its fundamental value in the next period. This increases the supply of shares
helping to curb rising prices. At a certain point of the upward trend, the fundamental-
ists’ strategy take over and prices are driven to the fundamental value of the stock. During
these upward trends of the market the uptick rule prevents the fundamentalists to take short
positions, see blue dots in the fourth row, right column of Figure (5). This phenomenon
is also emphasized by empirical analysis (see, e.g., [Alexander and Peterson, 1999] and
[Boehmer et al., 2008]), and represents a flaw of the regulation. The result is an increase of
the amplitude of the financial bubbles. As a positive effect of the regulation, it is possible
to notice a reduction in the frequency of occurrences of these bullish divergences.
The main point is that every time fundamentalists go short they force prices to con-
verge to the fundamental value. If it were possible to discriminate between the beliefs of
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the traders, fundamentalists should not be forbidden to go short in this situation. However,
this is a very difficult task and it is not even so easy to correctly determine the fundamental
values of a risky asset in the real market. A possible solution could be to allow short sales
after a long period of rising prices. This should avoid pushing up prices because funda-
mentalists (and contrarians, but these traders are not taken into consideration in this work)
are driven out of the market. Another possible solution could be to restrict short selling
only in cases of sharp and sudden falls in stock prices. This should produce two effects, to
let agents believing in the fundamental price go short when the price increases, reducing
positive oscillations of price deviations from the fundamental value, and to reduce sharp
drops in prices observed when the stock market bubble breaks. An important step in this
direction has already been done, the SEC adopted Rule 201 which was implemented on
February 28, 201112. This new short selling regulation prohibits short selling operations if
the value of the stock decreases by more than 10% in two consecutive trading sections.
Summarizing the analysis of the positive and negative price deviations from the funda-
mental value for the model with predictors (20) and (22) for the cases of unrestricted and
restricted short sales, we can conclude that the second goal of the regulation is ensured,
but some distorting effects produced by this rule are observed, such as overvaluation of
shares. Moreover, the short selling restriction can trigger distorting mechanisms that sup-
port dynamics of overpricing, otherwise not feasible in the long run. This is indicted by the
presence of multiple attractors in the region of positive price deviations in the bifurcation
diagram in the right column of Figure (4).
With the intent to provide a more detailed and comprehensive description of the ef-
12See, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61595 (Feb. 26, 2010).
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fects of the uptick rule, the same asset pricing model has been analyzed with a different
non-fundamental predictor (the Smoothed-ROC predictor, see Subsection 2.4). Differently
from other trend-following indicators, the Smoothed-ROC predictor is particularly useful
to detect fast and short-term upward and downward movements of the stock price and gives
different trading signals to agents than predictor (22), such as gain and lose of speed in the
trend (see [Elder, 1993]). In this case, we obtain an interesting and surprising result, i.e.,
the uptick rule helps to reduce the amplitude of price fluctuations, and causes an increase
of the frequency of oscillations above and below the fundamental value, this is made clear
by comparing the time series of prices in the first row of Figure (8). The explanation of this
lies on the higher degree of rationality (compared to the one assumed for chartists) of the
non-fundamentalist agents that the use of the non-linear predictor (S-ROC predictor) im-
plies. These agents are uncomfortable with extreme assessments of the value of the shares
and when the shares are forced to be overvalued due to the short selling constraints, non-
fundamental agents react and become more confidential in the fundamental price. This
changes their trading strategies and, as a results, the amplitude of the price fluctuations de-
creases instead of increasing as might be expected. The choice of the value of α plays an
important rule in this. We can conclude that by using this couple of predictors it is possible
to observe, at least when evolutionary pressure, β, is not excessively large, all the main
goals of the uptick rule: short selling restriction does not produce mispricing, prevents
chartists from going short during downward price movements to avoid reaching negative
price variation peaks and prevents fundamentalists from going short only in a downward
price movement for positive price deviations, reducing the speed of convergence to the
fundamental value and preventing sharps drops in prices. As a further observation, it is
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worth noticing that the uptick rule prevents extremely negative excess returns and at the
same time makes the strategy of fundamentalists on the average more profitable, changing
the beliefs of traders, compare n1,t and n2,t in Figure (8). Moreover, looking at the bifur-
cation diagram of Figure (7) right-column, it is clear that for relatively high values of the
intensity of choice, β, the uptick rule does not have any effect on the amplitude of price
fluctuations. As revealed by the analysis of the time series in Figure (9), this is due to the
fact that for high levels of β the market is always dominated by one trading strategy. It fol-
lows that the short selling constraint can apply either to a trading strategy adopted almost
by any trader or to a trading strategy adopted by almost all the traders. In the first case
the regulation does not have any effect on the price, in the second case it reverts the price
toward the fundamental value with the results of reducing the frequency of market-bubbles
but without reducing the amplitude of them. Compare the two panels in the first row of
Figure (9). For β large enough, at each trading section there is only one type of trader that
dominates the market and its demand of shares, being equal to the supply of outside share
per trader, must be positive, then the uptick rule does not affect the dynamics of prices.
The conducted analysis points out that the uptick rule meets part of its goals, but which
of them often depends on the condition of the markets. Moreover, the regulation can pro-
duce several side-effects which may be different according once again to the market’s
conditions and investor’s beliefs which may strongly influence the effectiveness of the
regulation itself. Due to these findings, studying the impact of the uptick rule on financial
markets does not seem to be an easy task. Nonetheless, it is possible to isolate some re-
markable effects regardless of market conditions and traders’ beliefs. First, the uptick rule
ensures a reduction of the downward market movements when the shares are undervalued,
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i.e. when the shares are priced below their fundamental value. Second, the intensity of
choice β to switch predictors affects the effectiveness of the short selling regulation. By
using the bifurcation analysis, it possible to observe that the effectiveness of the regulation
fades away increasing the value of β (increasing β, agents tend to overreact to the market’s
information, changing their beliefs quickly to react to past performances). In other words,
the switching destabilizing effect prevails over the regulation’s effects, i.e. when agents
overreact to the differences in performance related to different beliefs, the regulation does
not affect the dynamics of stock prices. This is consistent with many interesting empirical
results testifying that there is no statistical effect of the uptick rule on price fluctuations in
turbulent financial markets (see, e.g., [Diether et al., 2009]).
As a final remark, it is important to clarify that the simple asset pricing model used
in this paper can reproduce only some possible “stylized effects” which are a direct con-
sequence of the regulation. However, in the real financial markets many more different
trading strategies and emotional actions are present, which can modify the effectiveness
of the uptick rule.
5 Conclusions and future directions
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of the "uptick rule" on an asset price dynamics
by means of an asset pricing model with heterogeneous, adaptive beliefs. The analysis has
suggested the effectiveness of the regulation in reducing the downward price movements
of undervalued shares avoiding speculative behavior whenever the market is characterized
by not too many aggressive traders, i.e. when the agents’ propensity of changing trad-
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ing strategy is relatively low. On the contrary, when the agents have a high propensity
of changing trading strategy according to the past trading performances, which is a sign
of turbulent markets according to the model, the effects of the regulation tend to fade.
As a side effect of the regulation, an amplification of the market bubbles in the case of
overvalued shares is possible.
This work represents only a starting point. There are still several aspects that can and
deserve to be analyzed. First of all, it is interesting to analyze the effect of the uptick
regulation using the same asset pricing model with a greater number of investor types, for
example contrarians, chartists and fundamentalists. In fact, there is empirical evidence in
the literature about the switch in trading style by short-sellers. [Diether et al., 2009] found
that under the uptick rule most of the short positions are opened by contrarians, on the
contrary, when the uptick rule is not imposed are chartists, the ones who prefer to go short
(see, e.g., [Boehmer et al., 2008]). There is a hypothetical explanation for this. Chartists
take short positions in declining price trends and the uptick rule makes this operation more
difficult, on the contrary the restriction does not effect the contrarians’ short strategy. They
usually go short in upward price trend betting on a change in price movement with the
effect of stabilizing the market. Investigating the validity of this hypothesis provides a
better understanding of the issue.
The regulation should also be evaluated in the contest of the multi-assets market to
discover how the short selling restriction for one stock influences the price of the others.
It is reasonable to expect that traders will switch to trade stocks that are not effected by
the restriction in that specific moment and this can produce effects on prices which are not
easy to predict without a deep analysis.
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Another aspect that deserves to be investigated is the effect of the regulation when there
is a fraction of investors which does not change the trading strategy (or belief) as in [Dieci
et al., 2006]. As highlighted in this paper, the uptick rule loses its effectiveness due to a
high propensity to switch trading strategy by agents. It follows that, if there are constraints
on the possibility to change trading strategy, we expect an increase of the effectiveness of
the regulation and a reduction of unwelcome effects on price dynamics. Last but not least,
the piecewise continuous model here proposed can be easily adapted according to the new
short selling regulation imposed by the SEC, i.e. Rule 201. Comparing the two cases can
help to understand the pros and cons of the new regulation.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The existence of the fundamental equilibrium immediately follows
by substituting fh(0) = 0 into Eqs. (10) and (12). For the definition of the associated
eigenvalues, let us substitute Eq. (10b) written for nh,t into Eq. (10a) (and Eq. (12b) written
for mt into Eq. (12a)). Then, we can consider (xt−1, . . . , xt−(L+2)) as the state variables
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for both models, and the Jacobian of the system at the fundamental equilibrium is equal to

γ1 γ2 · · · γL
1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0
... . . . 0
0 0 · · · 1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
...
...
0 0
0 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0
1 0

,
which proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 2. At the equilibrium price deviation x¯, we obviously have xt = x¯1
and, from Eq. (10a), x¯ must satisfy
R =
H∑
h=1
nh,tfh(x¯1)/x¯.
Being nh,t ∈ (0, 1) for all h = 1, . . . , H , this is possible only if fh(x¯1)/x¯ < R for some h
and fk(x¯1)/x¯ > R for some k 6= h.
Proof of Lemma 3.
1. The uniqueness follows from Lemma 2, while the global stability from (12a), which
can be rewritten as
xt =
1
R
(n1,tv + n2,tg)xt−1,
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and contracts the deviation xt as t goes to infinity.
2. From Lemma 1, the non-zero eigenvalue associated to the fundamental equilibrium
is
λ(0) = γ1 =
1
2R
Ä
(1 + m¯(0))v + (1− m¯(0))gä > 0, m¯(0) = tanh (−βC/2) .
Thus the fundamental equilibrium can loose stability only when λ(0) = 1 at a tran-
scritical (or pitchfork) bifurcation (being fixed point of model (12, 21, 22) for any
admissible parameter setting, it cannot disappear through a saddle-node bifurcation).
Solving λ(0) = 1 for β gives βTR.
Evaluating Eqs. (10) at the generic equilibrium (x¯, m¯), solving Eq. (12a) for m¯, and
equating the result to Eq. (12b), we get
m¯ = 1− 2R− v
g − v = tanh
Ç
−β
2
Å
(−(R− 1)x¯+ aσ2s) g − v
aσ2
x¯+ C
ãå
,
which solved for x¯ gives x¯(±).
Solving x¯(+) = x¯(−) for β gives βLP and the equilibrium deviations x¯(±) are de-
fined only for β > βLP. There are therefore no other equilibria and this concludes
the proof of points (a), (LP), and (TR). Note that βLP = βTR when s = 0 (the
transcritical and saddle-node bifurcations coincide at a pitchfork bifurcation).
Substituting Eq. (12b) written for mt into Eq. (12a) and using (xt−1, xt−2, xt−3) as
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state variables, the Jacobian of the systems at equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) is given by

γ
(±)
1 γ
(±)
2 γ
(±)
3
1 0 0
0 1 0
 ,
with
γ
(±)
1 = 1 +
γ
R
x¯(±), γ(±)2 = −γx¯(±), γ(±)3 =
γ
R
Ä−(R− 1)x¯(±) + aσ2sä ,
and
γ = βx¯(±)
(g − v)2
4aσ2
sech2
Ç
−β
2
Å
(−(R− 1)x¯(±) + aσ2s) g − v
aσ2
x¯(±) + C
ãå
,
so the three associated eigenvalues λ1, λ2, λ3 are the roots of the characteristic
equation
λ3 − γ(±)1 λ2 − γ(±)2 λ− γ(±)3 = 0.
In particular, imposing λ = 1 and solving the characteristic equation for x¯(±), gives
only zero and xLP as solutions, so no other transcritical, saddle-node (or pitchfork)
bifurcation is possible. In contrast, imposing λ1 = −1 and taking into account that
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = γ1, we get λ2 + λ3 = 2 + γx¯(±)/R > 2 (note that γx¯(+) > 0 and
that γx¯(−) ≥ 0 only vanishes at the transcritical bifurcation), so that equilibrium
(x¯(±), m¯) would be unstable at a period-doubling (flip) bifurcation. However, both
equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) loose stability by increasing β, because the coefficient γ1 lin-
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early diverges with β (the limit as β → ∞ of the sech argument is finite and equal
to − log((R − v)/(g −R))/2 < 0), so the same does the sum of the eigenvalues.
Stability is therefore lost through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation and this concludes
the proof of points (b), (c), and (NS(±)).
3. For g > 2R − v, the non-zero eigenvalue λ(0) associated to the fundamental equi-
librium is larger than one for any β > 0. We also have βLP < 0, βTR < 0, and
equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) are defined for any β > 0 with x¯(+) > 0 and x¯(−) < 0. Simi-
larly to point 2, they loose stability through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
4. In the limiting case β →∞, from Eq. (12b) we have
mt+1 =

1 if (Rxt−1 − xt − aσ2s)g − v
aσ2
xt−1 > C,
−1 if (Rxt−1 − xt − aσ2s)g − v
aσ2
xt−1 < C.
Starting at x0 = ± with sufficiently small  > 0 and m1 = −1, we therefore have
xt = ±(g/R)t (see Eq. (12a)) as long as mt+1 stays at −1. Thus, xt diverges if
2(g/R)2t−1
(
R2
g
− 1∓ aσ2s−1(g/R)−t
)
g − v
aσ2
> C,
is never satisfied for increasing t, i.e., when g > R2.
Proof of Lemma 4.
1. At the fundamental equilibrium, the traders’ demands are positive (z¯(0)1 = z¯
(0)
2 =
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s), so (0, m¯(0)) is an admissible fixed point of the unconstrained dynamics for any
admissible parameter setting. Its local stability is therefore ruled by Lemma 3.
The global stability for 1 < g < R is a consequence of the following arguments.
First, the price deviation is contracted from period (t − 1) to period t (i.e., |xt| <
|xt−1|) whenever the unconstrained dynamics is applied (see Lemma 3, point 1).
Second, the unconstrained deviation x(0)t following xt−1 is smaller than any of the
constrained deviations x(1)t and x
(2)
t given by Eq. (17a) in region Z1 and Z2, respec-
tively. This is graphically clear from Figure (1), and is analytically shown by noting
that
x
(h)
t − x(0)t = −
aσ2
R
nh
nk
z
(0)
h,t > 0, h = 1, 2, k 6= h
(see (16b), and recall that z(0)h,t < 0 in region Zh). Third, from Eq. (17a) we get that
0 < x
(0)
t < x
(h)
t < (g/R)xt−1 when xt−1 > 0 and x
(0)
t < x
(h)
t < (v/R)xt−1 < 0
when xt−1 < 0. Thus, the constrained dynamics in regions Z1 and Z2 also contracts
the price deviation from period (t− 1) to period t.
Being x¯(+) > 0, equilibrium (x¯(+), m¯) can only collide with border ∂Z1 (see (19)),
at which x¯(+) = x¯(+)BC (the expression for x¯
(+)
BC can be easily obtained by solving
the first equation in (16b) with z(0)1,t = 0 for xt−1). It is obviously admissible iff
x¯(+) ≤ x¯(+)BC .
Depending on the parameter setting, equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) can be either positive or
negative, and can therefore collide with both borders ∂Z1 and ∂Z2. At the border
∂Z2, x¯(−) = x¯
(−)
BC (the expression for x¯
(−)
BC is obtained by solving the second equation
in (16b) with z(0)2,t = 0 for xt−1), so that (x¯(−), m¯) is admissible iff x¯
(−)
BC ≤ x¯(−) ≤
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x¯
(+)
BC .
2. If R + v > 2 (case (a)), x¯LP from Lemma 3 is smaller than x¯
(+)
BC , so that equilibria
(x¯(±), m¯) are admissible at the saddle-node bifurcation. The price deviation x¯(+)
increases as β increases and reaches x¯(+)BC at β = β
(+)
BC (collision with border ∂Z1). If
R+ v < 2 (case (b)), equilibria (x¯(±), m¯) are virtual at the saddle-node bifurcation.
The price deviation x¯(−) decreases as β increases and reaches x¯(+)BC at β = β
(+)
BC . If
R + v = 2 (case (c)), then β(+)BC = βLP.
Equilibrium (x¯(−), m¯) collides with the border ∂Z2 only if the limit of x¯(−) as β →
∞ is below x¯(−)BC . This yields the condition on s and the border collision at β = β(−)BC
in point (d).
3. For g > 2R − v, x¯(+) increases as β increases, whereas x¯(−) decreases, and their
limiting value for β →∞ are as in point 2. Equilibrium (x¯(+), m¯) is always virtual,
because its limiting value is above x¯(+)BC for any admissible parameter setting. Equi-
librium (x¯(−), m¯) becomes admissible at β = β(−)BC only if its limiting value is above
x¯
(−)
BC , which gives the conditions at points (a) and (b).
4. In the limiting case β → ∞, mt switches between ±1, so that only one type of
trader is present and the three options in Eq. (17a) give the same price deviation xt.
The result therefore follows from Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 5. From Lemma 1, the characteristic equation associated with the
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nontrivial eigenvalues of the fundamental equilibrium is λ2 − γ1λ− γ2 = 0, with
γ1 =
1
2R
Ä
(1 + m¯(0))v + 3(1− m¯(0))ä , γ2 = − 1
R
(1− m¯(0)).
Note that the same characteristic equation is obtained for both predictors (23a,b) and
(23a,c,d), and also for different choices of the confidence function (23d), as long as ∂αROC/∂ROC|ROC=1 =
0.
The fundamental equilibrium is stable at β = 0 (the Routh-Hurwitz-Jury test for 2nd-
order polynomials requires −γ2|β=0 = 1/R < 1 and γ1|β=0 = (v + 3)/(2R) < 1 −
γ2|β=0 = (R + 3 +R− 1)/(2R), which are readily satisfied).
As β increases, transcritical and saddle-node (or pitchfork) bifurcations are not possi-
ble. In fact, substituting λ1 = 1 into the constraints:
λ1 + λ2 = γ1, λ1λ2 = −γ2,
and eliminating λ2, we get the contradiction
R =
v
2
(1 + m¯(0)) +
1
2
(1− m¯(0))
(with left-hand side larger than one and right-hand side smaller than 1).
Similarly, we exclude flip bifurcations: imposing λ1 = −1 in the above constraints
and eliminating λ2, we get the contradiction
−R = v
2
(1 + m¯(0)) +
5
2
(1− m¯(0)).
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(with left-hand side positive and right-hand side negative).
To look for a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, we impose λ1λ2 = 1 and |λ1λ2| < 2. Under
the first condition, the second turns into v(1 + m¯(0)) < R that is always satisfied (recall
that m¯(0) < 0, see Lemma 1). Solving the first condition for β gives βNS.
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